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BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A HOLDING THAT THE ONE-ACTION RULE PRECLUDES AN ACTION FOR 
A DEFICIENCY WHEN MORTGAGED PROPERTY IS RELEASED WITH 
CONSENT OF THE MORTGAGOR IS NEITHER DESIRABLE NOR REQUIRED 
This Court has granted the Utah Bankers Association 
leave to file an amicus curiae brief with respect to this 
appeal. The Utah Bankers Association is a nonprofit trade 
association composed of all commercial banks located within the 
State of Utah. The object of this brief is to assist the Court 
in the application of the one-action rule, consistently with 
legislative intent and prior judicial construction, so as to 
avoid frustrating reasonable expections of lenders and 
borrowers. 
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.... 
Financing arrangements such as the one presented i· 
this case are common. 
. A construction. loan is the usual source of fu: 
with wh7ch the builder will finance the improvements he 
17ill build on the land. In essence, the construction Jr 
is a short-term loan, usually secured by a first mortg~ 
or deed of trust on the property, which will be paid ofi 
full as to each lot when the lot is ultimately sold to; 
~ome.buy7r. Most construction loans are made by 
institutional lenders; savings and loan associations 
comercial banks, and real estate investment trusts a;e t· 
most active participants. 
G. Nelson and D. Whitman, Cases and Materials on Real Estate 
Finance and Development, 553 (1976). 
A. THE ONE-ACTION RULE PERMITS SALE OF THE 
COLLATERAL IN ANY MANNER AGREED UPON BY THE 
MORTGAGOR 
This Court has articulated two purposes for the 
one-action rule: 
a. The statute was created for the very purpoo 
of doing away with the rule allowing an action on a note, 
and also a suit to foreclose the note securing it, and t 
avoid a multiplicity of actions on the same debt. 
Mickelson v Anderson, 81 Utah 444, 19 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1931 
b. It is therefore held that under that statu: 
the property mortgaged or pledged, or the proceeds derive 
upon a sale in an action in equity to foreclose the 
mortgage, constitutes the fund to pay the debt, and it~ 
be exhausted before a personal judgment can be entered 
against the makers of the note. 
Smith v Jarman, 61 Utah 125, 131, 211 P 962 (1922). See Not 
Mortgage Foreclosure: The One-Action Rule In Utah, 6 ~ 
Rev. 2 7 8 ( 19 5 9) . In tr.e case before this Court, there is no 
objective of the one-action rule to be served. The collaterc 
has been exhausted by agreement of the parties and there canr 
be a multiplicity of actions. Because the collateral has be' 
-2-
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sold and the proceeds applied to the debt by agreement of the 
parties prior to this suit on the note, this is not a suit on a 
debt secured by a mortgage. Therefore the one-action rule 
which applies only to debts "secured solely by a mortge.ge upon 
real estate" does not apply. Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (1953). 
Focusing upon the purposes of the one-action rule, the 
avoidance of a multiplicity of suits on the same debt and prior 
exhaustion of the collateral, assists in the proper application 
of the rule. Certainly, the beneficiary of a trust deed can 
cause exhaustion of the collateral pursuant to statute without 
fear that the one-action rule will bar a deficiency. 
Under the provisions of Sec. 57-1-23, U.C.A. 
1953, as amended, it is made optional with the beneficiary 
of the trust deed whether to foreclose the trust property 
after a breach of an obligation in a manner provided for 
foreclosure of mortgages or to have the trustee proceed 
under the power of sale provided therein. 
Security Title Co., v. Payless Builders Supply, 17 Utah 2d 179, 
407 P. 2d 141, 142 (1965). 
As with the trust deed sale, all sales of mortgaged 
property, with the consent of the mortgagor, whether by 
agreement at the time the mortgage is granted or thereafter, 
are compatable with the purposes of the one-action rule. 
Indeed, this Court has specifically approved such sales. 
The mortgagor and the mortgagee could agree upon 
the manner of sale, and, if the property was sold pursuant 
to the agreement at a fair price, no one, not even one who 
claimed a subsequent lien upon the property, could legally 
object. 
Utah Ass'n of Credit Men v Jones, 164 P. 1029, 1031 (1917) · 
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B. AN EXPANSION OF THE ONE-ACTION RULE TO PRECLUD' 
DEFICIENCIES AFTER A CONSENSUAL SALE OF MOR~~ 
PROPERTY WOULD SHARPLY CURTAIL AN IMPORTANT F~ 
OF FINANCING IN UTAH . 
Respondent has urged the lower Court to hold that 
because Appellant released the realty pursuant to agreement 
between parties, and could not, therefore, foreclose upon thE 
realty, it is barred by the one-action rule from collecti~~ 
balance due on the note. Such a windfall to the mortgagor is 
repugnant to all sense of fairness. Having released collater: 
with the mortgagor's agreement, the lender should not be 
punished by being denied an opportunity to recover the balanc' 
of its loan. Moreover, an application of the one-action ru~ 
to these facts changes the entire character of the relationsh: 
between mortgagors and mortgagees. 
If this Court adopts the position urged by respondent 
below, it appears inevitable that all real property securing 
the debt must be available for foreclosure. Thus, when the 
first lot is released, in fact, when an agreement such as ~e 
one before the Court is entered into, the lender has committed 
itself to look only to the collateral for recovery of its 
loan. Under such circumstances, lenders and borrowers wouN~ 
1/ 
unable to ever agree to the release of collateral- and no 
funding would be available in situations when such an agreemen'. 
is essential. 
!I If all the lots but one had been released, cou~ 
the lender refuse to release the last one - despite the prior 
Wl. th the letter of § 78-37-1 and agreement - merely to comply . -
establish a basis for a def 1c1ency judgmPnt? 
-4-
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If this be the law, a lender can give little weight to 
the financial strength of the borrower. The financial risks of 
a project are shifted from the borrower, who usually is in 
control of the project, to the lender whose maximum recovery is 
the amount of the loan and interest. The incentive of the 
borrower to make the project a success, and thereby avoid 
personal loss, is gone. Because of the lar.k of predictability 
of the cost and marketability of many real estate developments, 
the lender is rarely certain of sufficient collateral. Except 
in cases of exceptionally high collateral to loan ratios, no 
prudent lender could be expected to accept such risks. One 
important form of financing would be eliminated in Utah. 
POINT II 
THE ONE-ACTION RULE DOES NOT BAR AN ACTION AGAINST SURETIES 
In Point II of its brief, Appellant argues that 
Mr. and Mrs. Black are sureties. If they are sureties, this 
Court's previous decisions make it clear that they are not 
entitled to the benefit of the one-action rule. This Court has 
stated that the statute is for the protection of the mortgagor 
and possibly for "those who have or claim some specific lien 
upon the mortgaged property, but the statute was certainly not 
to give those whom neither have or claim to have any specific 
rights in or to the property the right to object." Utah Ass'n 
of Credit Men v Jones, 49 Utah 519, 164 P. 1029, 1030-31, 
(1917). "The provisions of that act apply only to actions 
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between mortgagors and mortgagees." P1· 11 b M · 11 s ury .1 s v N~ 
Processing Plant, 7 Utah 2d 286, 323 P.2d 266, 268, (1958). 
is important to remember that the concept of one action with 
respect to a mortgage is purely statutory. In stressing thi: 
point the Utah Supreme Court has quoted from 41 Am.Jur., Ple: 
and Collateral Security, § 99: 
The taking of collateral security for the pay1, 
of a debt does not, in the absence of a statute or 
stipulation to the contrary, afford any implication that 
the creditor is to look to it only or primarily for the 
payment of the debt. The obligation of the debtor to 
respond in his person and property is the same as if no 
security had been given, and upon default in payment, th' 
pledgee may elect to sue the pledgor for his debt, wit~. 
a sale of the security, and may recover a judg;nent in su: 
suit against the pledgor for the amount of the debt, 
without destroying or in the least affecting his lien on 
the property pledged. And he is not required to return: 
security before bringing suit on the claim secured, int' 
absence of a special contract to that effect, altho~h~ 
that claim is satisfied he may be compelled to release: 
reassign· the collaterals . 
Camobell v Peter, 108 Utah 565, 162 P. 2d 754 (1945). 
CONCLUSION 
Irrespective of the outcome of this appeal, the u~ 
curiae respectfully urges this Court to avoid any holding or 
dicta which would hamper the ability of lenders and borrower 
to enter into agreements for realty financing which would 
permit orderly release of collateral, pursuant to agreement, 
without risk of loss of the right to recover a deficiency. 
is suggested that the Court will achieve a correct result i'. 
applies the one-action rule only insofar as is necessary~ 
achieve its objectives, prevention of a multiplicity of sui: 
on the same debt and exhaustion of collateral before defici' 
judgment. 
-6-
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DATED this 26th day of November, 1979. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Byw~· 
Peter W. Bill~s 
By !tb-n L Okt.L 
Glen E. Clark 
Attorneys for 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that on this :Z-.6 day of November, 
1979, I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Amicus Curiae, postage prepaid, to Richard 
-I 
B. Ferrari and L.S. McCullough, Jr., Attorneys for Respond9~ 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, and to Steven H. Gunn, Ray, Quinney & 
Nebeker, Attorneys for Appellant, Suite 400, Deseret Buildi~, 
79 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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JAMES A. McINTOSH 
McMURRAY, McINTOSH, BUTLER & NIELSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Suite 800 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5125 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MORLEY WILSON and 
MARY ELLEN WILSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
PLAINTIFFS I ME..l10RANDUl1 OF _'; 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO 
DENY DEFENDANT' S MOTION TO ( 
DISMISS 
HUBERT C. LAMBERT, e 
Civil No. 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about October 16, 1978, the defendant filed for the· 
first time his MOTION TO DISMISS the above-entitled matter. 
MOTION was filed more than ten (10) years after the instant 
~is 
action was conunenced; more than seventeen (17) months after t~ 
defendant executed its STIPULATION agreeing that Morley Wilso~r 
and Mary Ellen Wilson could be substituted as parties plaintif£s 
in the above-entitled lawsuit thereby implying that the plain-. 
tiffs could move ahead on the said lawsuit; more than seven (7~ 
months after the court's own ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE hearing on M1¥"ch 
6, 1978, in which the court directed both parties in this cas~ to 
appear and show cause why the action should not be dismissed :!pr 
failure to prosecute at which time the plaintiffs and their 
counsel appeared; however neither the defendant nor his couns1l 
appeared and at which time the court dismissed its ORDER TO S~OW 
CAUSE and set the matter down for trial; more than eight (8) 
months after the plaintiffs filed their REQUEST FOR TRIAL SETTING 
stating that they were ready to proceed with trial in this matter; 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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but only approximately ten (10) days after the plaintiffs filed 
their FIRST INTERROGATORIES TO THE DEFENDANT requiring the defen-
dant to answer a substantial series of questions dealing with the 
issues in this case. It appears obvious the defendant wants to 
peacefully ignore this case and hope it will die an uneventful 
death but the he will refuse to do any work on the case to get it 
ready for trial. 
Within approximately one (1) week after receiving the defen-
dant's MOTION TO DISMISS, the plaintiffs filed their MOTION TO 
DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS and also filed their NOTICE OF 
MOTIONS setting this matter for an immediate hearing before the 
Honorable J. Harlan Burns on Wednesday, the 8th day of November, 
1978, conunencing at 3:00 p.m. Counsel for the defendant was not 
able to appear on that day and requested a continuance which was 
granted setting the matter for the present time on Tuesday, 
December 5, 1978, coIImlencing at 3:00 p.m. 
After the plaintiffs filed their MOTION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS and their NOTICE OF MOTIONS and within four (4) 
days thereafter, the defendant filed its MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF 
TIME TO ANSWER INTERROGATORIES requesting the court to extend the 
normal thirty (30) day period for the defendant to answer the 
INTERROGATORIES until thirty (30) days "from and after the entry 
of the final ORDER denying such dismissal," referring to the 
ORDER which the court might enter denying the defendant's MOTION 
TO DISMISS. 
The PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
set out ten (10) grounds upon which the plaintiffs would rely in 
arguing this matter to the above-entitled court. On November 29, 
1978, the defendant responded to the ten (10) points in that 
certain document entitled DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
The instant MEMORANDUM will set forth the plaintiffs' points 
and authorities upon which it is relying in support of its MOTION 
TO DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
-2-
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The COMPLAINT in the above-entitled matter was filed on 
March 11, 1968, in the above-entitled court by J. Lambert Gibson, 
Attorney for the plaintiff Jeff Baldwin. The State Engineer 
filed his ANS\JER on April 22, 1978, and mailed a copy of same to 
the plaintiff's attorney, J. Lambert Gibson at Gibson's Salt Lake 
City office address. 
Nothing further was done on the matter until on April 26, 
1973, when the above-entitled court through District Judge J. 
Harlan Burns entered an ORDER SETTING TRIALS setting the above-
enti tled case for trial on Monday, September 17, 1973. Again, 
notice of the said ORDER SETTING TRIALS was mailed to J. Lambert 
Gibson at his Salt Lake City office address, 174 East 800 South. 
For some reason unknown to either the present plaintiffs in this 
action or their counsel the said trial was not had at the time 
set. 
EXHIBIT 1 attached to this MEMORANDUM is a copy of an 
AFFIDAVIT executed by Dean W. Sheffield, Executive Director of 
the Utah State Bar, on October 30, 1978. In this AFFIDAVIT, Mr. 
Sheffield states in part as follows: 
2. J. Lambert Gibson was a member of the Utah 
State Bar having been admitted to the Bar January 5, 
1937. He was suspended from the Bar June 13, 1967, 
for non-payment of license fees and was re-instated 
April 26, 1968. Mr. Gibson was again suspended May 14, 
1971, for non-payment of license fees and was not 
thereafter re-instated. 
It thus appears that when the COMPLAINT was filed in the 
above-entitled matter on March 11, 1968, Mr. Gibson was not an 
active member of the Utah State Bar and was not authorized to 
practice law. He never made this fact known to the court appar-
ently, and was reinstated about six (6) weeks later on April 26, 
lq68. However, his license to practice law was again suspended 
on May 14, 1971, and from that time through the present date, he 
was not authorized to practice law. Apparently, none of this 
inforn1ettion wRs communicated either to his client, Jeff Baldwin, 
or to the above-entitled court since nothing appears in the 
official records on file in the Office of the Iron County Clerk. 
-3-
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furthermore, since the Clerk's Office has continued to send all 
mailings to J. Lambert Gibson as attorney for the plaintiff at 
his Salt Lake City law offices, it appears he d"d never i notify 
the court of either the fact that he was suspended from the 
practice of law or that the plaintiff, Jeff Baldwin, should 
retain new counsel. It is obvious from a casual inspection of 
the court records that no NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL was 
ever filed by Mr. Gibson. Under these circumstances, the plain-
tiff, Jeff Baldwin, was placed under a serious handicap and the 
status of Mr. Gibson's license to practice law is no doubt one of 
the main reaons why this case was not moved forward for so many 
years. 
The original plaintiff, Jeff Baldwin, died on November 8, 
1975, in Beaver County, State of Utah. [See paragraph 1 of the 
MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE PARTY PLAINTIFF filed in this court on or 
about May, 1977.] Thereafter, one, John Davis, was appointed the 
Administrator of the Estate of Jeff Baldwin, Deceased. [See 
EXHIBIT 1 attached to the said I10TION TO SUBSTITUTE PARTY PLAIN-
TIFF in the official records herein.] Subsequent to the said 
appointment and on or about August 6, 1976, certain real pro-
perty formerly owned by the said Jeff Baldwin was sold by the 
Administrator to Morley Wilson and Mary Ellen Wilson, his wife, 
the present plaintiffs in this matter; that the said property 
included among other things the four (4) Water Applications Nos. 
24624, 24625, 24626, and 24627, which were filed in the Office of 
the Utah State Engineer and which are the subject matter of this 
instant lawsuit. A copy of the CONTRACT OF SALE which was exe-
cuted between the Wilsons and John Davis as Administrator of the 
Estate of Jeff Baldwin is attached to this MEMORANDUM as EXHIBIT 
2 and is by reference incorporated herein and made a part hereof 
at this time. 
In the said EXHIBIT 2, the Wilsons agreed to pay a substan-
tial amount of money, to-wit: fifty-six thousand five hundred 
dollars ($56,500.00) for the real property and water rights which 
-4-
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are described in the said EXHIBIT. This is a substantial change 
in the plaintiffs-Wilsons' position and was made based on their 
interpretation of Jeff Baldwin's rights in the instant lawsuit. 
Since the water rights add substantially to the value of the nine 
hundred and sixty (960) acres of real property purchased, and 
since the purchase price would be far less than fifty-six thou-
sand five hundred dollars ($56,500.00) if the water rights did 
not exist, it is clear the Wilsons were only willing to pay the 
fifty-six thousand five hundred dollar ($56,500.00) purchase 
price if the water rights could be included. It was based on 
this assumption and the further assignment of the water rights by 
the Administrator, that the land CONTRACT (EXHIBIT 2 attached 
hereto) was executed by the Wilsons. Had the Wilsons had any 
intimation that the instant lawsuit involving the water rights 
was defective in any way or subject to a statutory MOTION TO 
DISMISS, they would never have executed the CONTRACT. 
Although the CONTRACT OF SALE attached hereto as EXHIBIT 2 
is dated August 6, 1976, the authority to execute the said CON-
TRACT was not given by the probate court for Beaver County until 
May 16, 1977, and a former CONTRACT OF SALE executed by Helen 
Lorraine Baldwin was superceded by the new one executed by John 
Davis, Administator. [See paragraph 4 of the MOTION TO SUBSTI-
TUTE PARTY PLAINTIFF on file herein.] Immediately after the said 
CONTRACT OF SALE was approved by the probate court for Beaver 
County on May 16, 1977, and the next day on May 17, 1977, the 
rlaintiffs, Morley Wilson and Mary Ellen Wilson, his wife, served 
tLeir MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE PARTY PLAINTIFFS in the above-entitled 
matter. On May 17, 1977, the defendant through his attorney, 
Dallin W. Jensen, executed a STIPULATION authorizing the substi-
tution of party plaintiffs and an ORDER was executed on May 19, 
1977, by Judge J. Harlan Burns permitting the substitution. 
These documents dealing with substitution of parties plain-
tiffs were prepared by James A. Mcintosh, new counsel of record 
for the Wilsons. Mr. Mcintosh was first contacted by Mr. Wilson 
-5-
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on March 17, 1977, and the following two (2) months were spent 
getting matters in the probate estate straightened. From May, 
1977, for the remainder of the year, Mr. Mcintosh spent a substan-
tial amount of time in conferences with his client, conferences 
with representatives from the State Engineer's Office, and in 
meetings with representatives from the United States Geological 
Survey Office. Other work was done in an effort to prepare this 
case for trial, and on or about February 13, 1978, the said 
Mcintosh filed on behalf of his clients a REQUEST FOR TRIAL 
SETTING asking the court to refer this matter for an immediate 
trial. 
An ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE hearing was held on March 6, 1978, 
pursuant to the court's own ORDER directly the parties to appear 
in the above-entitled court to show cause, if any, why the case 
should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute the action 
further. The plaintiffs and their connsel, James A. Mcintosh, 
were present at the time of the hearing; however neither the 
defendant nor his counsel appeared. Mr. Mcintosh explained to 
Judge J. Harlan Burns the sequence of activities that had occurred 
since he had been retained to represent the Wilson; and, after 
hearing these matters, the court dismissed its ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE and referred the matter to the trial calendar. 
Nothing further was done of this matter, and it was not set 
for the trial calendar for the following seven (7) months. 
Therefore, on or about October 3, 1978, the plaintiffs filed 
their FIRST INTERROGATORIES TO THE DEFENDANT dealing with substan-
~ial inquiries as to the issues raised in the pleadings on file 
herein. Faced with these INTERROGATORIES and the necessity of 
answering the same, the defendant in less than one (1) week after 
receiving the INTERROGATORIES filed for the first time his MOTION 
TO DISMISS. 
The defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS is based on § 73-3-15, Utah 
Code Annotated, and is further based upon the Utah Supreme Court 
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case of Dansie v. Lambert, 542 P.2d 742 (Utah 1975), which the 
defendant says is authority for his MOTION TO DISMISS. 
Immediately upon receipt of the said MOTION TO DISMISS, the 
plaintiffs filed their MOTION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS and set forth ten (10) grounds as a basis for the said 
denial. This instant MEMORANDUM will discuss those ten (10) 
points. 
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I. 
SECTION 73-3-15, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, IS UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL BECAUSE IT VIOLATES ARTICLE V, SECTION 1 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION DEALING WITH THE SEPARATION OF POWERS PRINCIPLE IN 
THAT IT IS A LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPT TO INTERFERE WITH A JUDICIAL 
FUNCTION. 
Section 73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads in part as 
follows: 
An action to review a decision of the State En-
gineer m~y be dismissed upon the application of any of 
the parties upon the grotmds provided in Rule 41 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the dismissal of 
actions generally and for failure to prosecute such 
action with diligence. For the purpose of this sec-
tion, failure to prosecute a suit to final judgment 
within two (2) years after it is filed, or, if an 
appeal is taken to the Supreme Court within three (3) 
years after the filing of the suit, shall constitute 
lack of diligence. 
The defendant argues this section is mandatory and allows 
the court no discretion whatsoever even though Rule 41 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is clearly discretionary with the 
trial judge. Section 73-3-15 is an attempt by the legislature to 
tell the court that cases must be brought to final judgment 
within two (2) years after a complaint is filed or to a final 
appeal within three (3) years after the filing of the complaint. 
This section was fatally defective even when passed in 1937; but 
is even more so forty-one (41) years later when the courts calen-
dars have become so congested and where it may be impossible for 
the matter to reach fruition at the trial level or for a final 
appeal decision to be made even though the plaintiffs are moving 
it ahead with dispatch. Section 73-3-15 does not require the 
trial judge to give water law appeals any priority on the calen-
dar; and therefore there would be nothing in the documents filed 
in the County Clerk's Office that would alert the clerk to give 
water law appeRls any priority. The section further makes no 
allowance for the contingencies of a sole trial judge in the 
area dying, the attorneys dying, the attorneys getting disbarred 
or suspended from the practice of law and not notifying their 
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clients or the courts as exists in the present case. The section 
does not require the defendant to make · a motion to dismiss at any 
particular time and therefore the defendant could theoretically 
wait until ten (10) days before the trial after the plaintiffs 
have incurred substantial attorney's fees and other court costs 
in preparing for the case and then make the motion to dismiss. 
Finally, the congested court calendars and other inevitable 
delays in bringing a case to trial, especially in large counties 
like Salt Lake Colll1ty, would effectively close the courtroom 
doors to any relief for the plaintiffs; even though they had done 
everything they could to try to satisfy the provisions of the 
statute. 
The courts have lll1iforrnly held that such statutes are lll1-
constitutional and void as being an attempt by the legislative 
branch of the governement to usurp the powers conferred upon the 
judicial branch of the government by the Constitution and to 
limit or abolish the judicial discretion belonging to the courts 
and necessary for the proper administration of justice. 
In Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Long, et al., 251 P. 486 
(Okla. 1926), the court was asked to construe a section of an 
initiative measure adopted by a vote of the people under the 
initiative and referendum laws of the State of Oklahoma providing 
that the district courts shall try certain classes of cases 
within ten (10) days after the defendant has answered, and that 
appeals must be taken within ten (10) days from the rendition of 
juclg1.1ent except for good cause shown the trial court may extend 
t'.1is time for a period of not to exceed twenty (20) days, and the 
Supreme Court shall determine the appeal at the earliest possible 
moment. The court held that not only the particular section 
being construed but the entire statute itself was invalid, uncon-
s ituti onal, and void. The court recognized the sole question 
presented by the appeal was whether the act, and particularly §3 
thereof, was in conflict with the provisions of the Oklahoma 
Constitution dealing with separation of powers. These provisions 
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were found in Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution of Okla-
homa and are similar to the provisions found in Article IV, 
Section 1, of the Utah Constitution. The court noted the law was 
well settled that the powers and functions of the three (3) 
several co-ordinant branches of the state government must be and 
forever remain separate and distinct, each one designed for a 
separate purpose and each functioning in its own sphere, and that 
the separation of powers doctrine was the basic principle of the 
constitutional system. 
After citing §3 of the Act, the court stated in part as 
follows: 
Then, the question here is, can the courts be 
stripped of their discretionary powers guaranteed to 
them under the Constitution, by the legislative branch 
of the Government, which, in this instance, is a vote 
of the people instead of an enactment of the legis-
lature. No one will deny that the legislative arm of 
the Government has the power to alter and regulate the 
procedure in both law and equity matters, but for it to 
compel the courts to give a hearing to a particular 
litigant at a particular time, to the absolute exclu-
sion of others who may have an egual claim upon its 
attention, strikes a blow at the very foundation of 
constitutional government. The right to control its 
order of business and to so conduct the same that the 
rights of all litigants may properly be safeguarded has 
always been recognized as inherent in courts. And to 
strip them of that authority would necessarily render 
them so impotent and ~seless as to leave little excuse 
for their existence and place in the hands of the 
legislative branch of the State power and control never 
contemplated by the Constitution. 
It takes no great exercise of the imagination to 
contemplate a condition arising wherein it would be 
impossible for the district court to try a particular 
case within ten (10) days after defendant had filed his 
answer, and that one or the other of the litigants 
would be entitled to a continuance, but under the 
provisions of this act, however meritorious an appli-
cation for continuance might be, it must be denied, and 
it is violative of the priciples of constitutional 
government and repugnant to every sense of justice to 
say that the court shall require one litigant to go to 
trial within a specified time under the provisions of 
this act where under the exact circumstances it would 
be a reversible error to require another litigant to go 
to trial, and yet this is the practical effect of the 
provision of the act before us. [emphasis added] 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court noted decisions from other juris-
dictions recognizing the absurd result created if the statute was 
upheld; and it accordingly held the act was unconstitutional, 
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~ 
invalid, and void, it being an attempt by the legislative branch 
of the government to usurp the power conferred upon the judicial 
branch of the government by the Constitution and to limit or 
abolish the judicial discretion belonging to the t 
cour s necessary 
for the proper administration of justice. 
Rule 4l(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure gives a 
trial judge discretionary power to dismiss an action for failure 
to prosecute. Section 73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is an 
attempt by the legislature to interfere with the judicial discre-
tion granted by Rule 5l(b). Under these circumstances it is 
obvious the statutory provision must fail because it is an attempt 
by the legislature to interfere with a judicial function, to-wit: 
that of the court docket and the quantity of businss submitted to 
the court, the nature, the importance, and the difficulties 
attending the just and legal solution of matters involved. 
In resolving an identical conflict between a statute similar 
to §73-3-15 and a rule of civil procedure similar to §4l(b), the 
j Hevada Supreme Court has held that the statute is void, invalid, 
~ 
~ and unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers 
doctrine. Lindauer v. Allen, 456 P.2d 851 (Nev. 1969). In 
discussing the priority between the judicial rules of civil 
procedure and statutes attempting to interfere with those rules, 
the Nevada Supreme Court stated: 
The legislature may, by statute, sanction the 
exercise of inherent powers by the courts, and the 
courts may acquiesce in such pronouncements b~ ~he 
legislature, but when a statute attempts to limit or 
destroy an inherent power of the courts, that statute 
must fail. 
Article 3, Section l, of the Nevada Constitution 
which provides for the division ~f the powers.of govern-
ment prohibits persons charged with the exercise of 
powers properly belonging to one of the three (3) 
separate departments from exercising any funct~ons . 
appertaining to either of the other~. A~y ~egi~lation 
undertakin to re uire "udicial action within fixed 
erio s o time is an unconstitutional inter erence b 
the legislature with a judicial unction: Whether o~ 
not justice is administered without 1 denial or delay 
is a matter for which the judges are answerab~e to th~ 
people and not to the General Assembly of Ohio. Mani-
festly: when a case can be heard and determined by a 
court must necessarily depend very largely upon the 
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court docket, and the quantity of business submitted to 
the court, the nature, the importance, and the diffi-
culties attending the just and legal solution of matters 
involved. [emphasis added] 
The court then held the rules of civil procedure did apply and the 
statute conflicting with those rules was unconstitutional and 
void. Similarly, in the instant case, §73-3-15 is clearly an 
attempt to interfere with the court's docket and the quantity of 
business submitted to the court, the nature, the importance, and 
the difficulties attending the just and legal solution of matters 
involved. 
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II. 
SECTION 73-3-15, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, IS UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL AND VOID BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND 
OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION IN THAT IT 
CREATES AN ARBITRARY CLASSIFICATION OF PERSONS MAKING APPEALS 
BEFORE AND AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ACT AND THE CLASSIFI-
CATION HAS NO REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TO THE PURPOSES OF THE ACT. 
Section 73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in part 
as follows: 
An action to review a decision of the State En-
gineer may be dismissed upon the application of any of 
the parties upon the grounds provided in Rule Lfl of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the dismissal of 
actions generally and for failure to prosecute such 
action with diligence. For the purpose of this sec-
tion, failure to prosecute a suit to final judgment 
within two (2) years after it is filed or, if an appeal 
is taken to the Supreme Court within three (3) years 
after the filing of the suit, shall constitute lack of 
diligence. All suits heretofore or hereafter commenced 
must be dismissed after ten (10) days' notice by regu-
lar mail to the plaintiff, unless such suits are or 
were prosecuted to final judgment within the time 
specified above; provided, as to suits filed before the 
enactment hereof the court may upon a proper showing 
extend the time for a rosecution to final "ud ent for 
a eriod of not to exceed two 2 ears from the date 
of hearin o an motion to dismiss iled ursuant to 
this section. emphasis added 
The underlined part of the quoted portion of §73-3-15 is 
fatal to the section because it creates an arbitrary classifica-
tion which substantially benefits those who file their lawsuits 
before the enactment of the act but does not allow this same 
benefit to those who file their lawsuits after the enactment of 
the act such as the plaintiffs in the instant case. Hence, it 
~rpears the classification is based entirely upon a time element, 
to-wit: whether the party has filed the complaint before the 
'"nactment of the act or after the that time. 
The obvious and unconsciousable result of the underlined 
provision is to allow a person who filed his appeal lawsuit in 
the oistrict court one (1) day before the act was passed to be 
able to sit on it for fifty (50) years before the motion to 
dismiss is made by the State Engineer; and then to receive a bene-
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fit of a further two (2) year extension; whereas a person who 
files one (1) day after the act is passed and who has not been 
able to bring the case to trial through no fault of his own is 
penalized by having the action dismissed upon the filing of the 
"motion to dismiss" without any further two (2) year extension 
being awarded. Similar arbitrary classifications based on time 
elements have been struck down in the overwhelming majority of 
the cases deciding this issue. 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that a denial of the 
equal protection of the laws occurs where there is a discrimina-
tion between those who are included and those who are excluded 
from the operation of a statute on the basis of an arbitrary 
classification. State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920 (1938). 
In Hasan, the court held that a classification is reasonable 
where the differentiation bears a reasonable relation to the 
purposes to be accomplished by the act. The purpose to be accom-
plished by §73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, as 
stated in the case of Dansie v. Lambert, supra, is "designed to 
put a time barrier against litigation, in determining the pre-
cious water rights in this arid state." If this is the purpose 
and basis of the statutory provision, then it would apply equally 
to those who file before the statute was enacted in 1937 as well 
as to those who file their lawsuits after the statement was 
enacted. Why shouldn't the plaintiffs be entitled to have the 
court extend the time for an additional two (2) years or less 
after the MOTION TO DISMISS is heard--the same right preserved to 
those filing before the effective date of the act? 
The legislature attempts to leave it up to the arbitrary 
whims of the Attorney General in filing his motion to dismiss and 
then goes on to extend the time an additional two (2) years after 
the mot"ic'n to dismiss is filed for those persons who commenced 
their LH,·suit prior to the effective date of the act. If the 
Attorney General waited twenty (20) years to bring the motion to 
dismiss, the claimant would receive an additional benefit of two 
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(2) years if he had commenced his lawsuit prior to the effective 
date of the act; and this result clearly would not further the 
purposes of the act to put a "time barrier against litigation in 
determining the precious water rights in this arid state." Under 
these circumstances, the persons who file their lawsuits after 
the effective date of the act are discriminated against and those 
who have filed lawsuits prior to the effective date of the act 
are favored. Clearly, such a classification based solely on time 
element has no relationship whatsoever to the purposes sought to 
be accomplished by the water act, and it is therefore a denial 
of the plaintiffs' equal protection of the law. 
In New Mexico, the legislature attempted to pass a certain 
statute (Laws 1921, Chapter 185) which provided that all private 
corporations organized under the laws of the Territory of New 
Mexico which failed to file an annual report would be automati-
cally dissolved. The New Mexico Supreme Court was called upon to 
construe this statute and determine if there was an arbitrary 
classification which denied certain corporations their equal 
protection of the law in that the act made the time of incorpora-
tion rather than the failure to file the reports the decisive 
factor in determining delinquency. State v. Sunset Ditch Co., 
145 P.2d 219 (N.M. 1944). The court held the statute was uncon-
stitutional and void because it created a legislative classifi-
cation based entirely upon a time element when the time selected 
had no reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. The 
court noted the act 
Did not apply to all existin~ corporation which.were 
delinquent in respect to making reports, etc.; it 
applied only to 'private corporations or7anized :inde7 
the laws of the Territory of Hew Mexico. Thus it will 
be seen that the act makes the time of incorporation 
rather than the mere failure to file reports, the 
decisive factor in determining delinquency as it effects 
a dissolution of the corporation and forfeiture of its 
charter. We see no reasonable basis for the distinc-
tion .... Many corporations, whether organized before 
or after January 6, 1912, the date of statehood, are 
the same type of corporation, are formed_unde7 the same 
laws, possessed like powers and present ident~cal 
problems of supervision and control. [emphasis added] 
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Similarly, in the instant case, the time element is also 
present in §73-3-15. The underlined portion quoted at the begin-
ning of this argument creates an arbitrary classification penali-
zing those seeking review of the Engineer's rulings in that those 
plaintiffs that filed their lawsuit before the enactment of the 
statute may, by continual extension and delay and an additional 
two (2) year benefit prolong litigation indefinitely, while those 
who filed after the enactment of the statute have no such privi-
lege. Yet plaintiffs in both cases bring the same type of suit, 
under the same statute, presenting "identical problems of super-
vision and control." Clearly, the section is tmconstitutional 
and creates an arbitrary classification which bears no reasonable 
relation to the purposes to be accomplished by the act and there-
fore is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the 
laws guaranteed both by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States and by Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
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III. 
SECTION 73-3-15 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID BECAUSE IT 
VIOLATES ARTICLE I, SECTION 11 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION IN THAT 
ITS APPLICATION TO THE INSTANT CASE CLOSES THE COURTROOM DOORS TO 
THE PLAINTIFFS. 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides as 
follows: 
All courts shall be open, and every person for an 
injury done to him and his person, property, or' repu-
tation, shall have remedy by due course of law which 
shall be administered without denial or tmnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribtmal in this state, by 
himself or cotmsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
party. 
This section of the Constitution clearly provides that 
courtroom doors shall be open to a litigant who has received 
injury to himself, property, or reputation and that he shall be 
able to pursue his property remedy in the courts of law without 
denial. Section 73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, does in fact 
deny the plaintiffs the opporttmity to prosecute their action in 
court and thus is an unconstitutional interference with Article 
I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. As pointed out above, 
the plaintiffs may with all dispatch attempt to move their case 
along; however because of circumstances over which they have no 
control whatsoever, it might be impossible for them to comply 
with the provisions of the statute which require them to bring 
their case to trial judgment in two (2) years or a final appeal 
decision within three (3) years. 
I11is harsh result arises even though §73-3-15 does not re-
quire the courts to give priority to water rights appeals, and 
does not require the State Engineer to bring the motion to dis-
miss within a reasonable time after the two (2) year period. 
Furthermore, the circumstances with respect to the congestion of 
court calendars and the matter of business had before the courts, 
the matters of litigants, attorneys, or judges dying, the matter 
of the time it takes a court reporter to get the transcript 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
prepared and filed especially under busy deadlines in the larger 
counties where numerous appeal are had; the problems of attorneys 
being disbarred or suspended from the practice of law and not 
letting their clients or the courts know it as in the present 
case, etc., etc., all argue against allowing validity to the 
Limitation Provisions §73-3-15. 
In Oklahoma City v. Castleberry, 413 P.2d 556 (Okla. 1966), 
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma was called upon to construe the 
policy of Article II, Section 6 of the Constitution of Oklahoma 
which is similar to Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitu-
tion. In vacating a default judgment against a landowner who had 
failed to appear at a condemnation proceeding where the action of 
an officer of the court misled him as to the time his cause would 
be tried, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated as follows: 
It is the policy of the law to afford every party 
to an action a fair opportunity to present his side of 
the case, and while it is true the courts must require 
diligence on the part of litigants in being present 
when cases in which they are interested are being 
proceeded with, nevertheless if the court or an officer 
of the court by their conduct mislead parties as to the 
time cases will be acted upon, the absense of such 
parties will be excused. 
Similarly, in the present case, the conduct of the court in 
denying its own MOTION and ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE dated January 10, 
1978, and referring this matter to the trial calendar and the 
defendant's approval of this action has induced the plaintiff to 
believe his action was being rightfully continued. Having relied 
thereon and proceeded with the litigation of the action by filing 
a REQUEST FOR TRIAL SETTING and by filing INTERROGATORIES, the 
plaintiff should not be "barred from prosecuting ... the civil 
,:aHse to which he [has become] a party." 
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IV. 
THE DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO ASSERT §73-3-15 UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, BECAUSE OF HIS CONDUCT INDUCING THE PLAIN-
TIFFS TO BEL~EVE HE WOULD RAISE IT; BECAUSE OF THE SUSPENSION OF 
JEFF BALDWIN S ATTORNEY FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAH; AND BECAUSE OF 
THE FAILURE OF THE DEFENDANT TO APPEAR AT THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
HEARING IN MARCH, 1978. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held §73-3-15 is "in substance 
and and effect . . . nothing more nor less than a Limitations 
Statute, . . Dansie v. Lambert, 542 P. 2d 742 (Utah 1975). 
Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes a 
Statute of Limitations as an affirmative defense. The Utah 
Supreme Court has ruled that a Statute of Limitations as an 
affirmative defense must be pleaded pursuant to this provision 
of the Rules. In Re: Jones' Estate (Jones v. State Tax Commis-
sion), 99 Utah 373, 104 P.2d 210 (1940). 
In Utah Delaware Minn. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 76 
Utah 187, 289 P. 94 (1930), the Utah Supreme Court again held 
that a Statute of Limitations defense is waived by the failure to 
plead it at the first opportunity. In this case, the mining 
company had been given notice of a claim made by one of its 
employees and also had been given notice of the hearing before 
the Industrial Commission. However, the mining company failed to 
appear. A rehearing was granted, and the mining company appeared; 
and for the first time interposed the Statute of Limitations 
defense. Refusing to allow the defense, the court stated: 
The general rule is that a party can re~y on the 
Statute of Limitations only where he pleads it an~ 
ordinarily is requried to interpose the plea at his 
first opportunity. 
In the instant case the defendant knew the Utah Supreme 
Court had held §73-3-15 to be a Limitations Statute. In fact, 
counsel for the defendant in the instant case, Dallin W. Jensen, 
was the same counsel who represented the defendant, State En-
gineer, in the Dansie case, supra. Yet, Mr. Jensen not only 
failed to raise the Limitations defense when the Dansie case was 
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decided on November 10, 1975, but rather 
went ahead in May of 
1977 and executed a STIPULATION allowing the instant lawsuit to 
move ahead by the subsitution of parties plaintiffs. 
The defendant could have raised the Statute of Limitations 
at any time subsequent to two (2) years after the COMPLAINT was 
filed in this matter on March 11, 1978. His failure to do so for 
such a long period of time has substantially prejudiced the 
present plaintiffs who had executed contracts calling for them to 
pay more than fifty-six thousand five hundred dollars ($56,500.00) 
for certain real property being purchased in connection with the 
water rights which are the subject matter of this lawsuit. Under 
these circumstances, the defendant has not only waived his right 
to raise the Statute of Limitations, but should be estopped to do 
so for the reasons more fully set forth hereafter. 
The defendant has further waived his right to assert §73-3-
15 because he has approved a STIPULATION substituting parties 
plaintiffs and has failed to appear at the court's own ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE hearing dealing with a possible dismissal under Rule 
41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Under these circum-
stances the courts have uniformly held that statutory provisions 
similar to §73-3-15 making a dismissal of an action mandatory 
after a certain time can be waived by the conduct of the parties. 
Bayle-Lacoste and Co., Inc. v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 
116 P.2d 458 (Cal.App. 1941); W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Spencer, 
ll8 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1941); Burke v. Minnesota Elevator Co., 186 
NW. 948 (N.D. 1922). 
In Bayle-Lacoste, supra, the court construed §583 of the 
'~alifornia Code of Civil Procedure which made it mandatory that 
an action should be dismissed as to parties served, if not brought 
to trial within five (5) years after the filing thereof, except 
where the parties have stipulated in writing that the time may be 
extend0cl. The court construed the statute to be 
tlot to rigid that under certain circumstances, not-
withstanding defendant's failure to.appear before the 
expiration of the five (5) year period, a party as 
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plaintiff, cro~s-compl~inant, or intervenor may not 
have the benefi~ of a waiver" by his op onent. A 
party who, not~ithstanding the absence ol service of 
summons upo~ him, makes a general appearance, filing, 
after the.five. (5) year period, an answer in which he 
seeks affirmative r7lief in damages, as in the present 
cas7, thus volun~ari~y becoming a party to the liti-
gation, thereby impliedly waives objection to the 
jurisdiction of the court and to the right of dismissal 
bas7d upon the record date of the "commencement" of the 
action ... : The purpose of the statute is plain: to 
prevent.avoidabl7 del~y for too long of period. It is 
not de~ign7d arbitrarily to close the proceeding a:ta'fl 
event in five ~5) y7ars, for it permits the parties to 
ext7nd the period without limitation, by written stipu-
lation: and. as we have already pointed out despite 
the mandatory language. implied exceptions are re-
cognized. [emphasis added] 
In Bayle-Lacoste, the defendant had filed its amended answer 
after the five (5) year period and thereafter sought to take 
advantage of the statute by moving for a dismissal under §583 of 
the California Code. The court held the defendant had acquiesced 
in the delay when it filed its amended answer; and therefore it 
had "waived" the mandatory provisions of the statute even though 
there was not a written stipulation. 
Similarly, in the instant case, where the defendant has 
executed a written STIPULATION agreeing that the present plain-
tiffs could be substituted as parties plaintiffs, and where the 
defendant has failed to appear at the court's own to ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE hearing in March of 1978, and has made no objection to 
the court's dismissal of the said hearing and the setting of this 
matter for trial, the defendant has certainly "waived" the provi-
sions of §73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The defendant had 
every opportunity to join in the court's MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE, yet the defendant failed to do so. 
In addition to the conduct of the defendant which clearly 
consitutes a "waiver" of his right to assert the provisions of 
§73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the action of the trial 
court in approving the continuation of this case and referring it 
to the trial calendar without objection by the defendant also 
argues Llgainst granting the defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS. In 
Cervi v. Town of Greenwood Village, 362 P.2d 150 (Colo. 1961), 
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the court postponed and vacated the trial over a period of eight 
(8) years at the multiple requests and failures of both parties. 
In denying the DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, the court held that 
although it had the inherent power to dismiss a cause for want of 
prosecution, such power is not unlimited, and should not be 
exercised where the record shows as here, that both parties 
nursed the case along with the court's approval. In the present 
case, the trial judge dismissed its own MOTION and referred the 
matter to a trial calendar thereby allowing the parties to con-
tinue the action. In reliance thereon, the plaintiff submitted 
INTERROGATORIES to the defendant. 
Finally, a MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE under 
§73-3-15 should not be granted where the attorney for the plain-
tiffs' predecessor was delinquent, was suspended from the prac-
tice of law, and never did notify either the court or his client 
of this fact; and where the present plaintiffs have engaged new 
counsel who have been diligent in moving the case ahead. 
EXHIBIT 1 attached to this MEMORANDUM is an AFFIDAVIT from 
Dean W. Sheffield, Executive Director of the Utah State Bar. In 
this AFFIDAVIT, Mr. Sheffield states as follows: 
J. Lambert Gibson was a member of the Utah State 
Bar having been admitted to the Bar January 5, 1937. 
He was suspended from the Bar June 13, 1967, for non-
payment of license fees and was re-instated April 26, 
1968. Mr. Gibson was again suspended May 14, 1971, for 
non-payment of license fees and was not thereafter 
reinstated. 
It thus appears that when the COMPLAINT was filed in the 
above-entitled matter on March 11, 1968, Mr. Gibson was not an 
active member of the Utah State Bar and was not authorized to 
1•ractice law. He never made this fact known to the court appar-
ently, and was reinstated about six (6) weeks later on April 26, 
1968. However, his license to practice law was again suspended 
on May lLf, 1971, and from that time through the present date, he 
was not authorized to practice law. Apparently, none of this 
inforT'.lation was communicated either to his client, Jeff Baldwin, 
or to the above-entitled court since nothing appears in the 
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official records on file in the Office of the Iron County Clerk. 
Furthermore, since the Clerk's Office has continued to send all 
mailings to J. Lambert Gibson as attorney for the plaintiff at 
his Salt Lake City law offices, it appears he never did notify 
the court of either the fact that he was suspended from the 
practice of law or that the plaintiff, Jeff Baldwin, should 
retain new counsel. It is obvious from a casual inspection of 
the court records that no NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL was 
ever filed by Mr. Gibson. Under these circumstances, the plain-
tiff, Jeff Baldwin, was placed under a serious handicap and the 
status of Mr. Gibson's license to practice law is no doubt one of 
the main reaons why this case was not moved forward for so many 
years. 
In Mizer v. Jones, 403 P.2d 767 (Colo. 1965), the court 
denied the defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS because it found that 
there were mitigating circumstances for the delay consisting of 
the plaintiff's first attorney having dragged his feet for nearly 
two (2) years and of the plaintiff's monetary inability to ac-
quire counsel for a year after that. The court held as follows: 
Up to the time of the withdrawal of their first 
attorney, the plaintiffs themselves were diligent in 
their efforts to have this lawsuit tried. . . . By the 
time the motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution was 
heard the plaintiffs were ready and anxious to proceed 
and were not trying to delay the cause .... In the 
final analysis, courts have the responsibility t~ do 
justice between disputing parties and one's day in 
court should not be denied except upon a serious show-
ing of willful default. Such is not the case here. 
[emphasis added] 
Similarly, in the instant case, the plaintiffs are ready, 
willing, and able to try the case at the present time and have 
been since they engaged new counsel in 1977. Under these cir-
cumstances, the trial court should not deny the plaintiffs their 
day in court. 
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v. 
THE DEFENDANT IS ESTOPPED TO ASSERT THE PROVISIONS OF §73-3-
15, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, BECAUSE OF THE DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT 
WHICH INDUCED THE PLAINTIFFS TO REASONABLY ASSUME THE INSTANT 
LAWSUIT WOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF PROSECUTION AND BECAUSE 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED THEIR POSITION BY 
INVESTING OVER FIFTY-SIX THOUSAND DOLLARS ($56,000.00) IN CERTAIN 
REAL PROPERTY AND WATER RIGHTS, WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF THE 
INSTANT LAWSUIT. 
By executing the STIPULATION agreeing that Morley Wilson and 
Mary Ellen Wilson, his wife, could be substituted as parties 
plaintiffs in the above-entitled lawsuit on May 17, 1977, some 
nine (9) years after the instant action was commenced, the defen-
dant agreed that the present litigation could be continued and 
would not be suject to a MOTION TO DISMISS. Furthermore, when 
the defendant failed to join in the court's own ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE in January, 1978, requiring both parties to appear and show 
cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prose-
cute and when the defendant failed to appear at the said ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE hearing and allowed the court to refer the matter to 
the trial calendar, it is clear that the defendant was not going 
to assert the dismissal provisions of §73-3-15, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. Based on this conduct by the defendant, the plain-
tiffs have incurred an indebtedness of over fifty-six thousand 
dollars ($56,000.00) for the purchase of certain real property 
and water rights which are connected thereto; which water rights 
include those in the instant case. The plaintiffs have also 
incurred substantial legal expenses and court costs and other 
expenses which they obviously would not have done had they felt 
the defendant would raise the provisions of §73-3-15. 
In Woley v. Turkus, the trial court had granted a MOTION TO 
DISMISS a plaintiff's COMPLAINT pursuant to the provisions of 
§583 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme 
Court of Cdlifornia reversed the action of the trial judge and 
said the action should not have been dismissed because of the 
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defendant's conduct notwithstanding the mandatory provisions of 
§583. Section 583 of the California Code of Civil Procedure 
reads similar to §73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Section 
583 states in part as follows: 
_An~ action heretofore or hereafter commenced shall 
be dismissed by the court in which the same shall have 
been corrnnenced or to which it may be transferred on 
m?tion of the defendant, after due notice to the plain-
tiff or by the court upon its own motion lID.less such 
action ~s ~rought t? tria~ within five (S) years after 
the ~laintiff ~as filed his actions, except where the 
parties have filed a stipulation in writing that the 
time may be extended . . .. 
The California Supreme Court held that the purpose of §583 
is to prevent avoidable delay in bringing an action to trial and 
recognizes that a delay of five (5) years as declared by the 
statute is unreasonable as a matter of law and is sufficient time 
to complete preliminary matters in bringing the cause to trial. 
However the court recognized that the statute is not designed 
To arbitrarily close the proceedings at all events in 
five (5) years. It expressly permits the parties to 
extend the period without limitation by written stipu-
lation. Exceptions have been recognized by the courts. 
One arises where a party is unable, from causes beyond 
his control, to bring to the case to trial either 
because of the total lack of jurisdiction in the strict 
sense on the part of the trial court or because proceed-
ing to trial would be both impracticable and futile. 
Whether it is impossible, impracticable, or futile to 
proceed to trial must be determined in the light of the 
circumstances in each case. The circumstances include 
not only the terms of a written stipulation but the 
acts and conduct of the parties and the proceedings 
themselves. [emphasis added] 
Similarly, in Tresway Aero Inc. v. Superior Court of Los 
Angeles Co., 96 Cal.Rptr. 571, 487 P.2d 1211 (1971), the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court was asked to entertain a mandamus proceeding 
to compel the Los Angeles County Superior Court to quash service 
c summons and to dismiss the action for failure to serve sunnnons 
1,·ithin three (3) years after the filing of the COMPLAINT. The 
Supreme Court held that where a corporate defendant received a 
copy of a COMPLAINT and a defective sunnnons and shortly there-
after requested and obtained a twenty (20) day extension of time 
in which to make appearance, and the defendant's manuvering 
getting additional time to plead resulted in plaintiff's failure 
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( 
to serve proper SUI!Ill1ons within the three (3) year period allowed 
from the filing of the COMPLAINT, the ends of substantial justice 
require that the defendant be estopped from moving to dismiss. 
The pertinent provisions of §58la of the California Code of Civil 
Procedure read as follows: 
No action heretofore or hereafter co=enced shall 
be further prosecuted, and no further proceedings shall 
be had thereon, and all actions heretofore or hereafter 
cornnenced must be dismissed by the court in which the 
same shall.have been COI!llllenced, on its own motion, or 
on the motion of any party interested therein whether 
named in the complaint as a party or not, .. '. unless 
the summons shall be served and a return thereon made 
within three (3) years after the commencement of said 
action, except where the parties file a stipulation in 
writing that the time may be extended. 
The California Supreme Court held that "notwithstanding the 
mandatory language of §58la, the trial court is vested with 
discretion in applying exceptions comparable to the discretion 
with which it is vested in apply exceptions to §583," of the Code 
of Civil Procedure requiring dismissal of actions not brought to 
trial within five (5) years after being filed. The court further 
held that as with the exercise of the court's other inherent and 
statutory powers to dismiss actions for want of diligence in 
either serving the summons or bringing the action to trial, the 
discretion pemitted must be "exercised in accordance with the 
spirit of the law and with the view of subserving, rather than 
defeating, the ends of substantial justice." The court recog-
nized that each case must be decided on its own particular facts, 
and no fixed rule can be prescribed to guide the court in its 
exercise of this discretionary power under all circumstances. 
In Tresway Aero Inc., supra, the court discussed the implied 
exception of impracticability and the doctrine of estoppel as 
related to §§58la and 583 of the California Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. The court stated these doctrines affirm that "a person 
may not lull another into a false sense of security by conduct 
causing the latter to forbear to do some things which he other-
wLe wo;1lcl hzive done and then take advantage of the inaction 
c;iused by his own conduct." Similarly, in the instant case where 
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the defendant's own conduct lulled the plaintiffs into the false 
sense of security that the action would not be dismissed, and 
where the plaintiffs have substantially invested time and money 
into the purchase of the real property and water rights and have 
further incurred legal fees and other court costs, the defendant 
should be estopped to raise the dismissal provisions of §73-3-15. 
If the defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS is granted, the plaintiffs 
will have purchased nine hundred and sixty (960) acres of ground 
that will be virtually worthless because there will be no water 
rights in connection therewith. 
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VI. 
THE UTAH CASE OF DANSIE v. LAl1BERT IS NOT CONTOLLING IN THE 
INSTANT CASE BECAUSE DANSIE DID NOT RAISE THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
OBJECTIONS TO §73-3-15 NOR THE WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL ISSUES AND 
BECAUSE DANSIE WAS DECIDED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF INDISPENSIBLE 
PARTIES AND NECESSARY JOINDER OF PARTIES. 
The only case cited by the defendant in support of its 
MOTION TO DISMISS is Dansie v. Lambert, 542 P.2d 742 (Utah 1975). 
The defendant basis its entire case upon the hope the trial judge 
will find Dansie is identical to the issues raised in the instant 
case. However, it is to be noted none of the arg1.llllents raised 
in this MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES were raised in the 
Dansie case. The only issues decided in the Dansie case were 
issues dealing with indispensible parties and necessary joinder 
of parties. In Dansie, the plaintiff argued that since the State 
Engineer had not joined in the other defendants' MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS under §73-3-15, the State Engineer was not entitled to 
the benefit of the dismissal. In noting this limited scope of 
the issue to be decided on appeal, the Supreme Court stated in 
part as follows: 
Plaintiff attacks the authority of the trial court 
to dismiss the complaint with prejudice against the 
defendant engineer, who did not join in the motion to 
dismiss, but plaintiff does not attack the ~uthor~ty as 
to the other co-defendants in which event, if plain-
tiff's request for relief were granted, there would 
remain a case lacking indispensible parties. 
Thus, the court is quick to point out that the plaintiff was not 
attacking the authority of the other co-defendants to raise the 
motion to dismiss. Conversely, however, the plaintiffs in the 
instant case are attacking the right of the State Engineer to 
raise the MOTION TO DISMISS and are attacking the provisions of 
§73-3-15 as being unconstitutional and void. The plaintiffs also 
allege the defendant-State Engineer cannot raise the limitation 
provisiuns in this statute because he has waived them or is 
estopped to raise them. None of these points were considered by 
the Supreme Court in Dansie. 
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The court went on to emphasize a second time the narrow 
issue raised on appeal by saying: 
Plaintif ~ does not claim the statute is or is not 
mandatory. ~is sole point on appeal is that the trial 
judge erred in granting the motion as to the Engineer. 
The fallacy of t~e contention lies in the fact that the 
s~at~te has nothing ~o do with joinder of parties, 
dismissal as to parties and the like, but simply ap-
plies to the life or death of a cause of action. 
It therefore appears clear the Utah Supreme Court has never 
passed on the issues of "waiver," "estoppel," and the constitu-
tional infirmities in the statute which are raised by the plain-
tiffs in the instant MEMORANDUM. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs respectfully 
request the court to deny the DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS on 
the grounds that §73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
is unconstitutional and void and/or on the further grotmds that 
the defendant State Engineer has waived his right to raise the 
limitations provisions of the said statute and/or is estopped to 
raise the said provisions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
Mcl1URRAY, McINTOSH, BUTLER & NIELSEN 
By .:Ju 
I 
I 
J 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTilORITIES IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS to Dallin W. Jensen, Assistant Attorney 
General, Attorney for State Engineer, 301 Empire Building, 
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231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 5th day 
of December, 1978. 
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State of Utah 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake) 
( 
-
Dean w. Sheffield, being first duly sworn on oath deposes and says: 
1. That he is the Executive Director of the Utah State Bar, and in 
that capacity has the records of the Utah State Bar under his direction and 
control, including the record of membership in the Utah State Bar. 
2. J. Lambert Gibson was a member of the Utah State Bar having been 
admitted to the Bar January 5, 1937. He was suspended from the Bar June 13, 
1967 for non-payment of license fees, and was re-instated April 26, 1968. 
Mr. Gibson was again suspended May 14, 1971 for non-payment of license fees 
and was not thereafter re-instated, 
L~,, , , I , -/iv,'.~; ~, / 
Dean w. Sheffield/ /l 
Executive Director 
Utah State Bar 
Sworn and subscribed before me the~ day of October, 1978. 
My .:cJminission expires~ay of~~ _lgkl. 
Notary Public 
EXHIBIT 1 
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COtlTR.i\CT OF SALE 
TH IS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 6th day of August, 
i, by and between John Davis as administrator of the estate of 
~ Baldwin a/k/a Jeffery Mathewson Baldwin, deceased, hereinafter 
led the SELLER and Morley Wilson and Mary Ellen Wilson, husband 
wife, as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship and not 
tenants in common, hereinafter called the BUYERS. 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
1. For and in consideration of the promises, covenants, and 
·eements hereinafter contained, the SELLER agrees to sell and the 
'ERS agree to purchase the following described property situated in 
; county of Iron, State of Utah, and more particularly described as 
Llows, to-wit: 
a. E 1/2 of Section 7 and all of Section 9, Township 32 South, 
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing approxi-
matelf 960 acres. 
b. Together with the following described personal property: 
two commercial gas engines to operate pumps, sprinkler heads 
and pipe, 89 lengths of 4" x 40' aluminum hand line galvanized 
pipe, water meter, and small culinary pump well. 
c. Together with approximately 106 acres underground water rights 
and any and all other water rights which are appurtenant to the 
960 acres described hereinabove to include, but not necessarily 
be limited to applications 24624, 24625, 24626, and 24627 which have 
been filed with the Utah State Engineer's office and which are the 
subject matter of that certain lawsuit in the District Court for 
Iron County, Civil No. 5178 entitled, Jeff Baldwin, Plaintiff, v. 
Hubert C. Lambert, State Engineer, Defendant. 
d. Together with all rights, privileges and improvements there-
unto belonging or in anywise appertaining, including an undivided 
one-half (1/2) interest in all oil, gas and any and all other 
underground rights and interests with the SELLER reserving to 
itself one-half (1/2) of said rights with the understanding that 
upon the death of the SELLER the entire oil, gas, and/or mineral 
rights or interests shall then pass to the BUYER herein. 
PURCHASE PRICE: As purchase price for said land and property, 
le B~i[FS agree to pay to the SELLER the sum of Fifty-Six Thousand 
ive H,rndred Dollars ($56,500.00) payable as follows: Three Thousand 
ive Hundred Dollars ($3,500.00) down on the date hereof, the receipt 
,f which is hereby acknowledged by the SELLER. The unpaid balance 
't the purchase price in the amount of Fifty-Three Thousand Dollars 
$53,000.00) shall be paid in ten (10) equal annual installments of 
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_j 
·i·ve Thousand Three Hundred Dollars ($5 300 00) h 1 , . eac p us accrued 
.nterest at the rate of five percent (5%) per annum on the unpaid 
)alance of the purchase price, with the first installment not to 
ie paid before the 30th day of November, 1978, and thereafter payable 
Jn the 30th day of November, each year thereafter until the total 
purchase price, plus accrued interest, has been paid in full. That 
interest at the rate of five percent (5%) per annum will commence to 
run on the 30th day of November, 1977. 
3. POSSESSION: The BUYERS shall have the right to possession 
and occupancy of said premises from and after the date hereof and so 
long as they are not in default under the terms of this agreement. 
4. TAXES: The taxes levied or assessed against said property 
for the year 1976 shall be paid by the SELLER, and the BUYERS shall be 
responsible for the payment of all taxes levied or assessed against 
the property from and after the year 1976 and during the remaining life 
of this agreement. 
5. WATER RIGHTS: It is understood and agreed there is a water 
right for forty (40) acres of underground right which has not been 
proved up on or certified by the State Engineer's office. The 
BUYER is to proceed with all diligence to prove up on said water right, 
but should it eventually happen through no fault of the BUYERS that 
the State Engineer during the first five (5) years of this agreement 
shall reject any part of the water right herein sold, the total pur-
chase price shall be reduced by the amount of Four Hundred Twenty-
?ive Dollars ($425.00) per acre for that property sold with water and 
that proper adjustment shall be made to subsequent payments. 
6. ESCROW: It is agreed that this agreement and all related 
docu:r,,mts are to be escrowed at the American Bank of Commerce, 444 
South Main Street, cedar city, Utah, and the following documents 
shall be placed with said escrow: 
a. 
b. 
The original of this Contract of Sale. 
A warranty deed describing the real and pers~nal pro-
perty herein sold, together with the water rights and 
naming as Grantor both the SELLER herein and any other 
heirs, devisees, and/or legatees to whom ~he said pro-
perty described in this CONTRACT OF SALE is to be dis-
tributed in the probate estate of Jeff.Baldwin, deceased; 
and naming as Grantees the BUYERS herein. 
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c. An abstract of title brought down to date to be fur-
nished to Robert.L. Gardner, Attorney at Law, for his 
examination of title and within a reasonable time there-
after, the abstract shall be placed in the escrow. 
It is agreed that all costs and expenses of said escrow shall 
be shared equally between the parties hereto. 
7. DEFAULT: In the event of a failure to comply with the terms 
hereof by the BUYERS or upon the failure to make any payment when the 
same shall become due and within thirty (30) days after written 
notice of said default, the SELLER shall be, at his option, released 
from all obligation in law and equity to convey the said property 
to the BUYERS, and all payments which have been made theretofore 
by said BUYERS shall be forfeited to the SELLER as liquidated damages 
for the nonperformance of this agreement, and the BUYERS agree that 
the SELLER may, at his option, re-enter and take possession of said 
property without legal process as in its first and former estate, 
together with all improvements and additions made by said BUYERS 
thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the land and become the property of the SELLER, and this agreement shall 
become null and void and of no further force and effect. 
It is agreed that time is of the essence of this agreement and 
the remedies given in the preceding paragraph to said SELLER are in 
addition to any and all other remedies provided by law. 
8. BINDING EFFECT: This agreement shall be binding on the heirs, 
dcstributees, successors, executors, administrators and personal 
representatives of each of the parties hereto. 
9. NOTICE: Any notice contemplated herein to be served upon eithe: 
party hereto shall be in writing and shall be sufficiently given if 
mai ;.• in the United states Post Office, postage prepaid and certified 
~ 0 tie parties at the following addresses: 
Ci£LLER: 
John Davis 
~ilford State Bank 
~1lford, Utah 84751 
Send notice to seller also to: 
Patrick !! . Fenton 
At torne:; at Law 
13 West Hoover Avenue 
Cedar Cit:;, Utah 8..J 720 
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'y 
§_~' 
Morley Wilson and Mary Ellen Wilson 
Box 147 
Enterprise, Utah 84725 
or such other addresses as the parties may from time to time in writing 
designate. Service of notice by mail shall be deemed effective and 
complete upon date of posting and mailing in accordance herewith. 
10. ATTORNEY'S FEES: Should it become necessary by either party 
to this agreement to employ legal counsel to enforce any term or 
provision hereof, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover 
from the other a reasonable attorney's fee plus costs. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this agreement have hereunto 
set their hands the day and year above first written. 
; ~ . 
MARY ELLEN WILSON 
-4 -
the 
Jeffery 
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